



# Cyber Risks and Opportunities in the Cloud

# Risk, The Future and Trust

Towards The Next  
Generation



Prof Bill Buchanan (Twitter: @billatnapier,  
Web: [asecuritysite.com](http://asecuritysite.com))



Transistor




Microchip



Microprocessor



The Cloud



THE ARPA NETWORK


DEC 1969

4 nodes

The Internet



The Personal Computer





# Cloud: The Future, Risk and Training

Introduction



Prof Bill Buchanan

## Large demand for IT graduates



We architecture, we design, we analyse, we build, and we test

## Why IT/Cloud?



There's lots of different jobs

- Networking.
- Security.
- Software Development.
- Media Design
- Mobile Devices
- Web Development.

New areas every day ...

- Cloud Computing.
- Big Data.
- Mobile Devices.





**Data increases every day:**



- 12TB of Tweets.
- 90% of all data in the Cloud produced in the last two years.
- 2,500,000,000,000,000 bytes of data produced every data 2.5 Quintillion Bytes – 1 billion hard disks

**It's part of every aspect of our lives...**

## Why IT/Cloud?



**Everything Is dependent on the Internet**

- Banking.
- Oil and Gas.
- E-Commerce.
- Transport.
- ... virtually everthing



**It's all going digital:**

- Data.
- Voice.
- Video/Images
- Sensors.





## Areas:



- Networks.
- Operating Systems.
- People/Motivations.
- Application Software.
- Encryption/Identity.
- Mobile Devices.
- Wireless ...

It's about  
understanding  
everything ...

## Computer Security and Digital Forensics



Every  
changing  
field

- New applications.
- New threats.
- Cloud and Mobility makes it an every great challenge.
- Lots of opportunities for different careers.



It's all going  
digital:

- Banking.
- On-line shopping.
- Media/News.
- Government.
- Health.





**Tech Companies**

It's part of most companies ...

Why Computing?




**Finance Industry**




... and lots of others



## Strategic Big Data



- 12TB of Tweets.
- 90% of all data in the Cloud produced in the last two years.
- 2,500,000,000,000,000 bytes of data produced every data 2.5 Quintillion Bytes – 1 billion hard disks

**Mobile Device Battles**

**In-memory Computing**

**Gartner Trend**



**Personal Cloud**



**Enterprise App Stores**

**Hybrid IT and Cloud Computing**

**Mobile Apps and HTML 5**

**Integrated Ecosystems**

**Internet of Things**

- All devices addressable


# Cloud: The Future, Risk and Training

Risk




Prof Bill Buchanan

# Top IT Initiatives for 2012




In 2012, which of the following will be the top 3 IT initiatives at your organization?



Source: IDC CIO Agenda Survey, November-December, 2011  
Data shows % of respondents who listed as a top 3 initiative, n = 36

## Q: Rate the **challenges/issues** of the 'cloud'/on-demand model

(Scale: 1 = Not at all concerned 5 = Very concerned)



Source: IDC Enterprise Panel, 3Q09, n = 263

## Audit/compliance

Can I be compliant with statutory and regulatory requirements?

- Where is my data stored?
- Who handles breach notifications?
- How long is my data stored for?
- How is eDiscovery handled?

## Understanding Risk



What is ... a threat ... a risk ... a vulnerability ... the motivation?

- Wide range of threats to organisations.
- Organisations now highly dependent on their information infrastructure.
- Real-time threat analysis needed to cope with threats.






## Understanding Risk




What is ... a threat ... a risk ... a vulnerability ... the motivation?


- Risk Taxonomy/Ontology required within the organisation.
- Business and Technical staff struggle to communicate on risk.



Get two risk management experts in a room, one financial and the other IT, and they will NOT be able to discuss risk. Each has **different context ... different vocabularies, definitions, metrics, processes and standards** (Woloch, 2006)







**A Threat:**


- Hacker.
- Spies
- Terrorists.
- Corporate Raiders.
- Professional Criminals.
- Vandals.
- Military Forces.

**is achieved with Attack Tools:**

- User command.
- Script or program.
- Autonomous Agent.
- Toolkit
- Distributed Tool.
- Data Tap.

**for Vulnerabilities:**

- Implementation vulnerability.
- Design vulnerability.
- Configuration vulnerability.

**for Objectives:**

- Challenge/Status.
- Political Gain.
- Financial Gain.
- Damage.
- Destruction of an Enemy.

**which Results in:**

- Corruption of Information.
- Disclosure of Information.
- Theft of Service.
- Denial-of-Service.

**with Access for:**

- Files.
- Data in transit.
- Objects in Transit.
- Invocations in Transit.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

### A cause or a fight?



Who? ... Why? ...  
Where? ... When?

- One person's freedom fighter is another's terrorist.
- One person's cause is another person's fight.


Martin Luther King




Che Guevara




Dalai Lama



Mahatma Gandhi



Benito Mussolini



Adolf Hitler

# Hacktivism



Who? ... Why? ...  
Where? ... When?

- Attacks against an organisation for political reasons.
- Who?
- Why?
- Where?
- When?

## 2012 /2013

- New York Times brought down by Syrian EA hacktivist.
- Anonymous focus on India on censorship.
- Virgin Broadband over PirateBay block.
- SOCA (Serious and Organised Crime Agency) over arrests, also Norwegian Lottery and Bild.
- Home Office sites over Gary McKinnon case.

## 2010, Mastercard and Visa

- Why: Decision to stop processing payments to the whistle-blowing site Wikileaks,
- Result: DDoS attacks on Visa, Mastercard, om.nl and politie.nl

## 2011, Tunisian government websites

- Why: Censorship of the Wikileaks documents
- Result: DDoS attacks against sites. Some Tounisians assisting in these attacks.

## 2009. Climate Research Unit of East Anglia University

Why: Emails published showed conspiracy to suppress data that contradicted their conclusions on global warming (Russian FTP server)

## 2011, HBGary

Why: HBGary were going after Anonymous  
Reward: Emails published, Web site defaced.

## 2010, Australian Government.

Why: Australian Government's attempt to filter the Internet.

## 2012. Department of Justice and the FBI.

Denial of service attack

## 2011. Sony's PlayStation Network.

- Why: Sony were suing Geohotz, who jailbroke the PlayStation 3.
- Result: Afterwards, a group of hackers claimed to have 2.2 million credit card numbers from PSN users for sale



# Hacktivism



Who? ... Why? ...  
Where? ... When?

- Attacks against an organisation for political reasons.
- Who?
- Why?
- Where?
- When?




**HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr to unmasked Anonymous with a list of HBGary contacts with NSA, Interpol, McAfee, and many others**



**Hbgaryfederal used CMS and comprised by:**

<http://www.hbgaryfederal.com/pages.php?pageNav=2&page=27>



**Username, passwords (stored as hash values), email database**



**Passwords broken by Rainbow tables**



**"ranger12"**

**"martin12"**



**CEO Aaron Barr and COO Ted Vera had weak passwords (six characters and two numbers) – which were easily broken**

**Passwords found for CEO and COO**

# Hacktivism



Who? ... Why? ...  
Where? ... When?

- Attacks against an organisation for political reasons.
- Who?
- Why?
- Where?
- When?



“ranger12”  
“martin12”

CEO Aaron Barr and COO Ted Vera used the same password for a range of systems: Twitter, email, Linked in, and so on.



Support.hbgary.com



Remote login to support.hbgary.com from Ted Vera's account



Flaw exploited in system to escalate privilege



Gigabytes of research and backup data

Aaron was a System Administrator for their Gmail Apps Hbgary account



Complete control of company email



# Hacktivism



Who? ... Why? ...  
Where? ... When?

- Use strong passwords.
- Never re-use passwords (30% of users do).
- Patch systems.
- Watch out for social engineering.
- Beware of unchecked Web sites.
- Get an SLA from your Cloud provider.
- Don't store emails in the Cloud.
- Restrict access from outside.



Now for another site owned by Greg Hoglund, owner of HBGary

Social Engineering ... to gain root password for Greg's site



Web site taken offline and user registration database published





**Security policy**

**Organisation of information systems**

**Asset management**

**Human resources security**

Critical Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices  
Critical Control 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

**Communications and Operational Management**

**Access Control**

**Physical and Environment Security**

Critical Control 5: Malware Defenses  
Critical Control 19: Secure Network Engineering

Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers  
Critical Control 12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges  
Critical Control 15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

**Business Continuity Management**

**Information System Acquisition, Development and Maintenance**


Critical Control 8: Data Recovery Capability  
Critical Control 17: Data Loss Prevention

**Compliance**

**Critical Control 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation**

**Critical Control 20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises**


**Critical Control 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps**



Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

**Automated Testing**

- Port scanning.
- Malware detection.
- SQL Database Exploits.



**Risks**

- Adverse Disclosure
- Service Availability
- Business Disruption
- Damage to or Modification to Assets
- Fraud/E-Crime
- Reputational Damage
- Legal and Regulatory Censure

**Threats**


- Malware
- Hacking
- Social Misuse
- Physical Error
- Environmental

**Actor**

- Internal
- External
- Trusted Partner

**Adversarial Role**


- Social Engineering.
- Password Cracking.
- Data Theft.



Technical Scan For Vulnerabilities (eg NISSUS)



Business Scan for Vulnerabilities (eg Human)



**Adversarial Role**

- Social Engineering.
- Password Cracking.
- Data Theft.

Adversarial Role

Adverse Disclosure  
 Service Availability  
 Business Disruption  
 Damage/Modification of Assets  
 Fraud/E-Crime  
 Reputational Damage  
 Legal and Regulatory Censure

**Risks**

Denial of Service

User Account Breach

Password Cracking

Physical Attack

Database Breach

Email Breach

SNMP Breach

Malware Install

Web Comprise

Backdoor Install

Spyware Install


SCADA Compromise

VoIP Compromise

Cloud Compromise



# Community Cloud




D-FET – A Community Cloud for Enhancing Skills using Virtualised Environments and Cloud-based Infrastructures

> D-FET – A Community Cloud


### Training Issues:


- Lack of standardized images of training.
- Lack of engagement from industry/law enforcement.
- Environment is fairly static and not changing.
- Students not exposed to a wide range of tools and environments.
- Lack on training on real-life environments.
- Physical location can restrict training opportunities.
- And so on.



### Validation Issues:

- Lack of validation for tools, especially for closed-source ones.
- No standardized framework for evaluation.
- Lack of repeatability.
- No standardization for the quality of digital forensics tools.
- Simulators suffer from not being realist enough.
- And so on.









Good...

... Bad



Difficult to use many of the techniques within a real-life space



Virtual spaces allow for a more complex and deeper understand of how to secure infrastructures

Demands on professional certification



Employers now require in-depth knowledge and a range of skills

The screenshot shows the AWS Management Console 'Launch Instance' page. A table lists several EC2 instances with columns for Name, Instance ID, AMI ID, Root Device, Type, and State.

Name	Instance ID	AMI ID	Root Device	Type	State
anycurlsite.com - Do not stop	i-022617c	ami-c3859aa	efs	m1.large	running
Problems.com - Do not delete	i-0e4629e	ami-c3859aa	efs	m1.large	stopped
Alatus Research	i-2967556	ami-c3859aa	efs	m1.large	stopped
900-8999 (student)	i-0441477	ami-4c3be937	efs	t1.micro	running
Rich 2623	i-7855de0c	ami-5241933c	efs	t1.micro	stopped
Rich 4-0	i-803a6ac0	ami-4c3be937	efs	t1.micro	stopped
Problems.com	i-6634935	ami-c3859aa	efs	m1.large	running
Bit Tech	i-6441817	ami-2342054c	efs	t1.micro	running
VPC Instance 1	i-908056f	ami-1c5e2775	efs	t1.micro	running

The screenshot shows the Windows Azure portal 'all items' page. A table lists various services with columns for Name, Type, Status, Subscription, and Location.

NAME	TYPE	STATUS	SUBSCRIPTION	LOCATION
billbuchen	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	West US
billbuchen2	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	West US
anycurlsite	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	West US
Telemets	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	East Asia
highlandb	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	East Asia
lbp	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	East Asia
shed	Web Site	Running	Appa020V009670	East Asia
anycurlsite	Cloud service	Created	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia
billbuchen	Cloud service	Created	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia
billbuchen2	Cloud service	Created	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia
billbuchen3	Cloud service	Created	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia
billbuchen4	Cloud service	Created	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia
billbuchen5	Cloud service	Created	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia
Problems.com	Storage Account	Online	Appa020V009670	Southeast Asia

The screenshot shows the VMware vCenter Management console. A table lists virtual machines with columns for Name, State, Status, and Host.

Name	State	Status	Host
BT	Powered On	Normal	146.176.166.63
BT2_45097128	Powered On	Normal	146.176.166.67
BT3	Powered On	Normal	146.176.166.67
Encas41	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.65
Encas2	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.69
Encas3	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.67
Encas4	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.66
Encas5	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.65
Ubuntu01	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.67
Ubuntu02	Powered Off	Normal	146.176.166.67





Internal Network (192.168.x.x/16)

Public Network Connection

Firewall/Router

Controlling signals

ESXi Host (Socesx2)

Controller (Socesx1)

iSCSI

Shared Storage (4TB)

ESXi Host (Socesx3)


ESXi Host (Socesx4)

Lab Manager Cluster

- Lab Manager
- Router/Firewall
- Storage Server
- Virtual Centre

vCenter

Cloud



Napier vCenter infrastructure



Configuration: bill

Last Job: Undeployed Configuration bill (13)(17/04/2011 20:38:04)

Virtual Machines

Console	VM Name	Status	NIC	Network	IP Address	External IP	Template	Host	Conn
	CONSOLE	Deployed	1*	Student Network	DHCP	-	Ubuntu	sooesx2.napier.ac.uk	
	UBUNTU	Deployed	1*	Student Network	DHCP	-	Ubuntu	sooesx2.napier.ac.uk	
	WINDOWS2003	Deployed	1*	Student Network	DHCP	-	Windows 2003	sooesx3.napier.ac.uk	
	BackTrack	Deployed	1*	Student Network	DHCP	-	BackTrack	sooesx2.napier.ac.uk	

UBUNTU

```
File Edit View Terminal Help
Ping Scan Timing: About 50.00% done; ETC: 12:48 (0:00:01 remaining)
Note: Host seems down. If it is really up, but blocking our ping probe
Nmap done: 1 IP address (0 hosts up)
napier@ubuntu:~$ ifconfig
eth5
  Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:26:42:00:01
  inet addr:192.168.242.24
  inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:fe00:0001%eth5
  UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST
  RX packets:1000801 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 on interface: eth5
  TX packets:4919 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 on interface: eth5
  collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
  RX bytes:76528956 (76.5 MB)
  Interrupt:19 Base address: 0x00000000

lo
  Link encap:Local Loopback
  inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.255.255.0
  inet6 addr: ::1:128 Scope:LOCAL
  UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536
  RX packets:11 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 on interface: lo
  TX packets:11 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 on interface: lo
  collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
  RX bytes:744 (744.0 B) TX bytes:744 (744.0 B)

napier@ubuntu:~$
```

WINDOWS2003



BackTrack 4

- Partition Editor
- Services
- Shared Folders
- Time and Date
- Users and Groups
- Yakuake
- ettercap - Ettercap
- kpowersave - Battery Monitor
- Software Sources
- KInfoCenter - Info Center
- KSysGuard - Performance Monitor
- Konsole - Terminal Program

Cloud Computing


Cloud








Re-distributable Instance (RDI)




```



INSTANCE LOAD [Image=WINDOWS2003]
MOUNT INSTANCE [Disk=STANDARDISK] AS [Partition="c" ]
ACTIVITY LOAD [Number=12] [Type=JPEG IMAGES; Class=DRUGS]
    INTO [Folder=USER FOLDER]
    AT [Period=1 MINUTE] [Interval=INTERVAL]
    FOR [User=Fred]
  
```



Results Evaluator




Activity Script




Host Forensic Image (HFI) Creator

Cloud Computing

Cloud




```
INSTANCE LOAD [Image=WINDOVS2003]
MOUNT INSTANCE [Disk=STANDARDISK] AS [ Partition="c" ]
ACTIVITY LOAD [Number=12] [ Type=JPEG IMAGES; Class=DRUGS]
    INTO [ Folder=USER FOLDER]
    AT [ Period=1 MINUTE] [ Interval=INTERVAL]
    FOR [ User=Fred ]
ACTIVITY EVENT [ Event=LOGIN; User=Fred ]
ACTIVITY EVENT [ Event=DELETEFILE; User=Fred ; File=JPEF IMAGES]
ACTIVITY EVENT [ Event=LOGOUT; User=Fred ]
```



Virtualisation Cluster (VMWare ESXi)


Results Evaluator



Activity Script




Host Forensic Image (HFI) Creator



Host Forensic Image (HFI)

HFI Library



Disk Instance (DI) Library




Forensic Media Library (FML)



**Forensics Quality Evaluator**  
(Speed of response, CPU utilization, memory footprint, thread utilization, and so on)



**Evaluation report**



**Forensic Quality Metrics**


- Presence of known illicit images
- Presence of known illicit movies
- Evidence of accessing/viewing/uploading/downloading illicit material
- Evidence of moving/copying/burning/printing illicit material to other locations
- User accounts – number and names
- Presence of filesharing software
- Filesharing history vs known bad files
- Presence of counter-forensics software
- ...
- Hidden files (unallocated space) - recovery
- Deleted files - recovery
- String searches for ASCII strings
- String searches for UNICODE strings

**Tool validation:**

- Supports a wide range of tool validation.
- Ever changing environment for a range of testing.

**Skills:**

- Allows students to remotely complete labs.
- Students training on state-of-the-art infrastructures.
- Different labs can be created for different situations (DF Tools/OSs/etc).
- Supports remote/distance learning.
- Infrastructure can be ring-fenced.
- Supports group work in an isolated environment.
- In-depth analysis of infrastructures.
- Students can build systems from scratch.
- Students can update their own infrastructure/tools, as required.
- Seems to engage the students, and show them a wide potential.
- Encourages students to continue work after the lab/tutorial.
- Time windows of labs/tutorials can be carefully controlled.
- Extensive and complex infrastructures assessed within a sandboxed environments.

**Drawbacks:**

- Requires an investment in time in creating and maintaining the virtual image.
- Students can avoid the lab situation.
- Possibly requires a backup strategy for labs (if using network-based virtualisation – but has advantages that a standalone version does not need a network connection).
- Goes against the stand-alone machine philosophy.

**Other advantages:**

- Easy for teaching team to update.
- Helps with franchised colleges.
- Easy setup for classroom demonstrations.
- Infrastructure can be ring-fenced.
- Produces repeatable labs.
- Not dependent on Napier/network infrastructure.
- Time windows of labs/tutorials can be carefully controlled.

# Cloud: The Future, Risk and Training

Towards the Next  
Generation



Prof Bill Buchanan